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Rapid economic growth has failed to significantly improve poverty and nutrition outcomes in Tanzania. 
This raises concerns over a decoupling of growth, poverty, and nutrition. We link recent production trends 
to household incomes using a regionalized, dynamic computable general equilibrium and microsimulation 
model. Results indicate that the structure of economic growth—not the level—is currently constraining 
the rate of poverty reduction in Tanzania. Most importantly, agricultural growth trends have been driven 
by larger-scale farmers and by crops grown in only a few regions of the country. The slow expansion of 
food crops and livestock also explains the weak relationship between agricultural growth and nutrition 
outcomes. Additional model simulations find that accelerating agricultural growth, particularly in maize, 
greatly strengthens the growth–poverty relationship and enhances households’ caloric availability. We 
conclude that low productivity, market constraints (including downstream agroprocessing), and barriers to 
import substitution for major food crops are among the more binding constraints to reducing poverty and 
improving nutrition in Tanzania. 
Keywords: economic growth, poverty, nutrition, computable general equilibrium modeling, 
Tanzania 1 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
Despite its poor performance during the 1990s, the economy of Tanzania expanded rapidly after the turn 
of the century, with national gross domestic product (GDP) growing at 6.6 percent per year during 1998–
2007 (MOFEA 2008). Economic growth also appears to have been relatively broad based. Although the 
newly established gold-mining sector recorded the highest growth rates during 1998–2007, the large 
agriculture and manufacturing sectors contributed the most to national growth. However, despite 
Tanzania’s high and seemingly broad-based economic growth, household income poverty has remained 
virtually unchanged. The national poverty headcount fell only 2.1 percentage points, from 35.7 percent in 
2000–2001 to 33.6 percent in 2007, with equally modest declines in rural and urban areas (World Bank 
2009). Economic growth therefore appears to have little effect on poverty in Tanzania. Indeed, the 
country’s poverty–growth elasticity was at most 0.76 during 2001–2007.
1
Along with persistent income poverty, Tanzania also suffers from high levels of malnutrition. 
About 17 percent of children are underweight, and 4 out of every 10 children are stunted (World Bank 
2007, 2008). Recent trends suggest that while average per capita agricultural GDP expanded rapidly 
during 1998–2007, caloric availability at the household level hardly improved. For example, estimates 
based on the two latest household surveys show that the share of people who had insufficient calories 
available to them fell only slightly, from around 25.0 to 23.5 percent, between 2000–2001 and 2007 
(World Bank 2009). This suggests that rising farm and national incomes have little effect on households’ 
access to food, ability to acquire food, or both; and it raises further concerns about a possible disconnect 
between agricultural growth and nutritional outcomes. 
 This relatively weak 
relationship raises concerns over a possible decoupling of economic growth and poverty reduction in 
Tanzania. Moreover, the household surveys find that income inequality did not change significantly 
during 2001–2007 (World Bank 2009). This suggests an inconsistency between the high growth reported 
in national accounts and the small changes in poverty and inequality from the household surveys. 
Together, the weak poverty–growth elasticity and the inconsistency between growth, poverty, and 
inequality trends underline the need to better understand the consequences of alternative sources of 
growth.  
Tanzania’s development outcomes over the last decade raise three questions. First, is the level 
and structure of the current economic growth path consistent with the slow decline in national poverty and 
only modest improvement in caloric availability? Second, what is the contribution of agriculture in 
reducing poverty and raising caloric availability? Finally, which agricultural subsectors are most effective 
at achieving national growth, poverty, and nutrition objectives? We address these questions using a 
regionalized and dynamic computable general equilibrium (DCGE) model. A microsimulation module is 
linked sequentially to the DCGE model to measure how changes in economic growth affect households in 
terms of poverty and food expenditure levels, which in turn determines caloric availability.
2
                                                   
1 Appendix C discusses the discrepancies between growth and poverty estimates in Tanzania and the difficulties in 
measuring poverty–growth elasticities.  
 Section 2 
reviews recent agricultural production trends in Tanzania and examines the relationship between poverty 
and nutrition. Section 3 uses the DCGE model to estimate the poverty impacts of Tanzania’s current 
growth path, thereby assessing the consistency between recent growth and poverty trends. Section 4 then 
estimates the impact of accelerating broad-based agricultural growth as a means of strengthening the 
growth–poverty relationship. Based on these findings, Section 5 identifies agricultural subsectors that are 
most effective at generating economic growth, reducing income poverty, and improving caloric 
availability in households. The final section summarizes our findings and their policy implications. 
2 Appendixes A and B describe the DCGE model and microsimulation module, respectively. 2 
2.  AGRICULTURE, POVERTY, AND NUTRITION IN TANZANIA 
In this section we examine the structure and recent performance of the agricultural sector and use 
microsurvey data to explore the relationship between household consumption and caloric availability. 
This provides the context for the forward-looking assessments in subsequent sections. 
Recent Agricultural Production Trends 
Table 1 shows the structure of crop production in Tanzania. More than half of the total harvested land 
area is allocated to cereals, of which maize is the country’s dominant staple food crop. Despite its 
favorable agroecological conditions, Tanzania is a net importer of cereals. Maize yields are typically low 
(0.88 tons per hectare) because smallholder farmers rely on traditional technologies and produce mainly 
for subsistence (MINAG 2004). Wheat, on the other hand, is produced almost exclusively by large-scale 
commercial farmers in the Northern zone using modern inputs. Growth in cereals production varies 
greatly by crop (FAO 2009). Maize production expanded more slowly than the overall population during 
2000–2007, implying declining per capita production. In contrast, wheat and rice grew rapidly over the 
same period, with rice becoming a particularly important crop for smallholder farmers in the Western and 
Lake zones (MINAG 2006) and an important food source for higher-income households (World Bank 
2009). Indeed, even the rapid expansion of rice and wheat production has failed to keep pace with rising 
consumer demand, causing imports to rise. Thus, it was rice and wheat that drove cereals production 
growth during 2000–2007, and not more widely produced maize.  
Table 1. Agricultural production statistics  
  Harvested land area, 2007  Production quantities  Yields, 
2007 
(mt/ha) 










Total  8,209  100.00         
Cereals             
  Maize  2,690  32.77  0.82  2,354  2.08  0.88 
  Sorghum  649  7.91  0.00  486  3.31  0.75 
  Millet  256  3.12  0.00  139  0.17  0.54 
  Rice  546  6.65  0.00  1,084  6.24  1.99 
  Wheat and barley  80  0.97  100.00  95  8.49  1.18 
Root crops             
  Cassava  660  8.04  0.00  5,284  3.54  8.01 
  Other roots  539  6.57  0.00  1,168  5.26  2.17 
Pulses and oilseeds             
  Pulses  792  9.64  1.37  516  –4.32  0.65 
  Coconuts  310  3.78  100.00  370  0.00  1.19 
  Oilseeds  380  4.62  0.00  238  5.01  0.63 
Horticulture  647  7.89  0.00       
  Plantains  308  3.75  0.00  565  0.12  1.83 
  Fruits  167  2.03  8.15  671  11.98  4.02 
  Vegetables  172  2.10  0.00  1,163  0.22  6.74 
Export-oriented crops             
  Coffee  137  1.67  40.90  53  –0.03  0.39 
  Cashews  80  0.97  11.23  75  –2.12  0.94 
  Cotton  295  3.59  0.00  181  9.49  0.61 
  Sisal  46  0.56  100.00  24  3.60  0.51 
  Sugarcane  17  0.21  60.88  273  8.47  16.06 
  Tea  19  0.23  69.51  30  3.80  1.59 
  Tobacco  34  0.41  27.21  18  11.39  0.52 
  Other crops  33  0.40  0.00  17  1.76  0.51 
Source: Authors’ calculations using Tanzania DCGE and microsimulation model, FAOSTAT (FAO 2009), and the 2002–2003 
Agricultural Sample Survey (MINAG 2004).3 
Roots, such as cassava and potatoes, are also important food sources in Tanzania and account for 
almost 15 percent of harvested land. Root crops performed well during 2000–2007, with more than 4 
percent annual growth. In contrast, higher-value pulses and vegetables stagnated, with pulses production 
declining by more than 4 percent each year. This was offset by rapid growth of fruit production in the 
Northern and Eastern zones, and by oilseed crops grown in most parts of the country. Noncereal food 
crop production has therefore been characterized by slow growth in the more widely produced pulses and 
vegetables crops and by fast growth in more regionally concentrated fruits. 
Some of the fastest growth rates during 2000–2007 were for export-oriented crops. Traditional 
crops, such as cotton, sugarcane, and tobacco, grew at almost 10 percent per year. These crops are highly 
concentrated in specific regions. Cotton is mostly produced by smallholders in the Western and Lake 
zones (81.5 percent of output). Tobacco, another smallholder crop, is mainly produced in the Western and 
Highlands zones (82.8 percent). Finally, sugarcane is mostly produced by larger-scale commercial 
farmers in the Eastern and Northern zones (83.8 percent). Together these three crops generated 17.4 
percent of the total export merchandise in 2007. Coffee and tobacco are also major export crops, but their 
production has declined in recent years. Export agriculture therefore grew rapidly during 2000–2007, 
driven by the strong performance of a few regionally concentrated crops. 
Finally, livestock and fisheries are key subsectors, accounting for almost a third of agricultural 
GDP. Fisheries kept pace with overall agricultural production during 1998–2007, growing at 5.1 percent 
per year. However, livestock has lagged behind crop agriculture, growing at only 3.3 percent per year. 
Incomes from cattle and poultry are important for farm livelihoods in many parts of the country, and 
especially for lower-income households (World Bank 2009). Thus, their slow growth will have 
implications for household incomes, especially for the poor. 
An examination of recent production trends suggest that although the agricultural sector as a 
whole grew rapidly during 2000–2007, the source of this growth has been concentrated among a few 
crops. Rice and wheat, for example, dominate cereals production trends; cotton, tobacco, and sugar grew 
at almost 10 percent per year. These well-performing crops are more heavily concentrated in the northern 
and eastern periphery of the country and are more often produced by larger-scale commercial farmers. 
Thus, while the strong expansion of the aggregate agricultural sector in recent years suggests that 
economic growth in Tanzania is broad based, a closer examination of agricultural production data 
suggests the opposite. In Section 3 we use the DCGE to replicate these production trends and consider 
their implications for poverty reduction and changes in caloric availability.  
Economic Growth and Household Nutrition 
Household nutrition status has not improved substantially, despite high rates of economic growth. For 
instance, based on a calorie line of 2,550 kilocalories per adult equivalent per day, the share of the 
population with insufficient calorie consumption declined only marginally from approximately 25.0 to 
23.5 percent during 2001–2007 (World Bank 2009).
3
The analysis here focuses only on the availability of calories at the household level, drawing on 
household expenditure survey information on purchased foods. The use of household-level expenditure 
survey data necessitates the use of the term caloric availability as opposed to caloric intake, because the 
 Similarly, while the share of underweight children 
fell from 25 percent to 17 percent during 1999–2005, the rate of child stunting remained virtually 
unchanged at about 40 percent of children under the age of five (Alderman et al. 2006; World Bank 2007, 
2008). As with poverty, these poor outcomes raise concerns over why rapid economic growth has not 
translated into much greater improvements in nutritional outcomes.  
                                                   
3 Tanzania’s “official” calorie line is 2,200 kilocalories and was used by the National Bureau of Statistics in the estimation 
of a food poverty line for the country (NBS 2002). The World Bank (2009) used 2,550 kilocalories as a benchmark, which is a 
“general” calorie line recommended by the UNU, WHO, and FAO (2004) for male adults involved in “light activity”. This line is 
higher than the calorie lines typically used in African studies, but in order to ensure comparability with the World Bank (2009) 
results, we use this same calorie line in the analyses here (also see Appendix B).  4 
quantities of food actually consumed by household members themselves and the distribution of purchased 
foods among its members cannot be determined.
4
Caloric availability is only one dimension of nutrition. For example, a joint report by the United 
Nations University (UNU), World Health Organization (WHO), and Food and Agriculture Organization 
of the United Nations (FAO) warns that energy needs should ideally not be considered in isolation of 
other nutrients in the diet (particularly micronutrients such as minerals and vitamins), because “the lack of 
one will influence the others” (UNU, WHO, and FAO 2004:4). However, in reality, poor households 
typically allocate large shares of their budgets to food types with high caloric content, mainly to avoid 
feelings of hunger (Ecker and Qaim 2009). From that perspective, and given our joint focus on poverty, 
this study’s focus on caloric availability is justifiable.  
  
It is generally accepted that the relationship between per capita incomes and caloric availability is 
positive. The relationship is further characterized by a calorie–income elasticity that is inelastic, meaning 
that a 1 percent increase in income (measured at the mean) is associated with a less than 1 percent 
increase in calories, causality issues aside. The surveys by Strauss and Thomas (1995) and Hoddinott et 
al. (2000) suggest that elasticities estimated from calorie demand equations in developing countries fall 
mostly between 0.3 and 0.5, although some studies have estimated values as low as 0.11. For Tanzania, 
Abdulai and Aubert (2004) estimate an elasticity of between 0.49 and 0.53. 
While parametric analyses are useful for obtaining point estimates of calorie–income elasticities, 
nonparametric analyses often suggest strong nonlinearities in this relationship, with households at the 
lower end of the income distribution typically displaying higher calorie–income elasticities than wealthier 
households (see Strauss and Thomas 1995; Subramanian and Deaton 1996; and Hoddinott et al. 2000). 
The same is true for Tanzania, where, according to the Household Budget Survey (HBS) 2000–2001 
(NBS 2002), the calorie–income curve becomes noticeably flatter at or beyond the median per capita 
income level and above the minimum daily caloric requirement (Figure 1).  
Figure 1. Nonparametric estimates of income–calorie curves (Lowess smoothing)  
 
Source: Authors’ estimates using the HBS 2000–2001 (NBS 2002). 
The aim of this study is to improve our understanding of the relationship between economic 
growth and improvements in caloric availability over time. We use a calorie–growth analysis, which is 
more nuanced than but related to a calorie–income relationship, where real per capita GDP growth 
                                                   
4 Appendix B elaborates on the “nutrition module” and the methods used to extract information on caloric availability from 














































Log per capita expenditure5 
implies higher household incomes and hence an increased availability of calories in the average 
household.  
In order to ensure comparability with poverty–growth elasticities also used in this analysis (see 
Appendix C), we define the calorie–growth elasticity as the percentage change in the calorie deficiency 
rate divided by the percentage change in per capita GDP.
5 The calorie deficiency rate is similar to a 
poverty headcount rate in that it indicates the share of the population that is below the calorie line. 
According to national accounts, per capita GDP grew at 3.99 percent per year during 2001–2007, while 
the household surveys estimate that the calorie deficiency rate fell by 1.03 percent per year (i.e., from 
25.0 to 23.5 percent). This gives a calorie–growth elasticity of 0.26 (i.e., 1.03/3.99).
6
The DCGE model incorporates a very detailed set of food commodity accounts. Each of these 
food types is associated with a certain calorie content. Column 2 of Table 2 shows how the price per 100 
kilocalories varies across food products. For example, livestock products have larger calorie contents per 
serving than other animal products and most other foods. However, the higher price of animal products 
means that these are ultimately an expensive source of energy. The final two columns show that a large 
share of daily calories available to food-insecure households is obtained from foods with low prices per 
calorie.  
 In contrast to the 
normal calorie–income elasticity, which considers changes in average caloric availability, the calorie–
growth elasticity is sensitive to growth-induced changes in caloric availability in households close to the 
calorie deficiency line only.  
The nature of economic growth will clearly be important in determining the nutrition impact. 
First, with regard to the distribution of growth, it is clear that if growth favors high-income households, 
the average availability of calories may not rise as much as under a pro-poor growth scenario given the 
lower calorie–income elasticities in high-income households. Second, different compositions of economic 
growth may have differential impacts on relative food prices. Whether policies cause reductions in root 
crop prices or cereal prices may have very different implications for caloric availability given caloric 
contents of these foods. Furthermore, given differences in food expenditure patterns across different 
household types, one growth strategy may be good for poverty reduction, while another may be favored 
for its nutrition impacts.  
Table 2. Calories per serving, price per kilocalorie, and urban–rural calorie composition 
  Calories per 
serving  






Daily per capita caloric 
availability in food-insecure 
households 
Share of daily per capita 
caloric availability in food-
insecure households (%) 








              All food products    6.6  2,063  2,045  100.0  100.0 
              Agricultural products  206  5.9  741  939  35.9  45.9 
   Cereals  319  3.1  233  314  11.3  15.4 
        Maize  252  3.0  212  251  10.3  12.3 
        Sorghum  339  3.2  6  25  0.3  1.2 
        Millet  361  3.9  4  5  0.2  0.2 
        Rice  362  3.5  8  16  0.4  0.8 
        Wheat & barley  330  3.7  3  17  0.1  0.8 
                                                   
5 In contrast, the calorie–income elasticity is obtained by dividing the percentage change in caloric availability by the 
percentage change in household income.  
6 Using the household surveys estimate of per capita income growth (as a proxy for per capita GDP growth) the elasticity is 
0.78 (i.e., 1.03/1.32; see Appendix C). 6 
Table 2. Continued. 
  Calories per 
serving  






Daily per capita caloric 
availability in food-insecure 
households 
Share of daily per capita 
caloric availability in food-
insecure households (%) 








   Root crops  178  4.1  142  345  6.9  16.9 
        Cassava  237  3.5  73  106  3.5  5.2 
        Other roots  158  4.4  69  239  3.3  11.7 
   Pulses & oilseeds  443  8.7  272  178  13.2  8.7 
        Pulses  260  9.4  94  101  4.6  4.9 
        Coconuts  70  9.4  28  5  1.4  0.2 
        Oilseeds  594  9.4  150  72  7.3  3.5 
   Horticulture  49  18.3  93  101  4.5  4.9 
        Plantains  116  5.0  38  68  1.8  3.3 
        Fruits  60  12.2  26  10  1.3  0.5 
        Vegetables  43  49.0  29  23  1.4  1.1 
   Cashews  589  6.2  1  1  0.0  0.0 
              Animal products  259  22.4  150  95  7.3  4.6 
   Cattle  252  20.7  103  48  5.0  2.3 
   Poultry  226  37.4  9  7  0.4  0.3 
   Other livestock  338  16.7  6  21  0.3  1.0 
   Fish  169  25.6  32  19  1.6  0.9 
              Processed foods  232  6.1  1,068  983  51.8  48.1 
   Meat  289  16.0  42  39  2.0  1.9 
   Maize milling  362  3.6  517  663  25.1  32.4 
   Rice milling  174  18.3  177  54  8.6  2.6 
   Other milling  256  5.0  40  133  1.9  6.5 
   Other foods  261  28.0  114  32  5.5  1.6 
   Refined sugar  222  11.2  166  52  8.0  2.5 
   Beverages  43  26.6  12  10  0.6  0.5 
              Prepared meals  91  18.0  104  28  5.0  1.4 
             
Source: Authors’ calculations using HBS 2000–2001 (NBS 2002) and Lukmanji et al. (2008). 
Note: For the purpose of this table, food insecure is defined as the bottom 40 percent of the population as ranked by adult 
equivalent per capita caloric availability.  
Identifying trade-offs between growth, poverty, and nutrition outcomes pose a serious challenge 
for governments designing their development strategies. The use of a model that captures detailed 
consumption patterns and income sources of households (specifically the linkages between households 
and different agricultural activities) is ideally suited to exploring policy scenarios.   
The next section replicates Tanzania’s current growth path using an economywide modeling 
framework and then assesses the role of economic growth in determining poverty and nutrition outcomes 
based on caloric availability.7 
3.  POVERTY REDUCTION UNDER TANZANIA’S CURRENT GROWTH PATH 
The previous section reviewed current patterns of agricultural growth. In this section we calibrate the 
DCGE model to replicate recent production trends and consider the impact of this “baseline” growth 
scenario on poverty and caloric availability. The model includes 58 sectors (half in agriculture and 
agroprocessing). Agriculture is further disaggregated across 20 subnational regions and small- and large-
scale farmers.
7
Columns 6 and 7 in Table 3 show observed production growth rates for 2000–2007 and modeled 
growth rates in the baseline scenario. Using maize as an example, national production in the baseline 
scenario grows at 2.11 percent per year during 2009–2015, which is similar to the 2.08 percent annual 
growth rate observed during 2000–2007. This is partly achieved by allowing total harvested land area in 
Tanzania to expand at 2 percent per year during 2009–2015. The model endogenously allocates available 
land in each of the 20 regions across crops in order to maximize returns. We then exogenously increase 
total factor productivity (TFP) for each crop and region in order to achieve the targeted production growth 
rate. This causes crop land yields to change. For example, maize yields rise from 0.91 to 1.02 tons per 
hectare during 2009–2015 (i.e., the annual yield growth rate of 1.45 percent shown in column 2). This 
process of targeting production trends is repeated for each crop and livestock subsector. We also target 
nonagricultural sector GDP growth rates using trends from national accounts for 1998–2007 (MOFEA 
2008).
 This spatial dimension of the model captures different cropping patterns and 
agroecological conditions within the country. The core dataset of the model is a 2007 social accounting 
matrix (SAM) that reconciles various data sources, including national accounts and household survey 
data. Information on crop production and livestock is from the 2002–2003 agricultural sample census 
(MINAG 2004, 2006). Nonagricultural production and employment data was compiled from the HBS 
2000–2001 (NBS 2002). On the demand side, information on industrial technologies (e.g., intermediate 
and factor demand) was taken from an earlier SAM for Tanzania (Thurlow and Wobst 2003). Finally, the 
income and expenditure patterns and income elasticities for the various farm and nonfarm household 
groups in the model were estimated using HBS 2000–2001. The detailed economywide structure of the 
DCGE model therefore allows us to estimate in a consistent framework how changes in production and 
trade influence other producers through various factor and product markets and generate incomes for 
different household groups, thus affecting their poverty status and caloric availability. 
                                                   
7 The 20 regions are grouped into eight zones for reporting (see Table A.2 and Figure A.1 in the appendix). 8 
Table 3. Crop yields and area and production outcomes under the baseline and agriculture scenarios (national level) 
  Crop yields 
(exogenous: imposed on the model) 
Production quantity 
(endogenous: results from the model) 

























  mt/ha  %  mt/ha  %  1,000 mt  %  %  1,000 mt  % 
  2009  2009–2015  2015  2009–2015  2009  2000–2007  2009–2015  2015  2009–2015 
                    Cereals                   
    Maize  0.91  1.45  1.24  3.94  2,508  2.08  2.11  3,593  4.60 
    Sorghum  0.78  1.57  0.93  2.19  534  3.31  3.35  751  4.36 
    Millet  0.50  –2.85  0.50  0.08  144  0.17  1.02  186  3.23 
    Rice  2.20  4.00  3.09  4.30  1,251  6.24  5.55  1,974  5.86 
    Wheat & barley  1.40  7.08  2.47  7.36  116  8.49  8.68  231  8.97 
Root crops                           
    Cassava  8.57  2.52  11.13  3.32  5,737  3.54  3.07  7,972  4.20 
    Other roots  2.47  5.16  3.72  5.25  1,296  5.26  3.87  1,887  4.81 
Pulses & oilseeds                           
    Pulses  0.53  –6.97  0.38  –4.05  482  –4.32  –1.90  498  0.42 
    Coconuts  1.15  –1.41  1.18  0.31  372  0.00  0.07  429  1.81 
    Oilseeds  0.70  4.49  0.98  4.33  272  5.01  4.88  432  5.94 
Horticulture                           
    Plantains  1.74  –1.54  1.79  0.30  580  0.12  0.89  706  2.49 
    Fruits  5.58  12.41  13.59  11.76  787  11.98  6.94  1,388  7.35 
    Vegetables  6.55  –0.80  7.55  1.79  1,180  0.22  0.37  1,485  2.92 
Export crops                           
    Coffee  0.37  –2.41  0.51  4.05  53  –0.03  –0.95  82  5.61 
    Cashews  0.81  –5.97  0.81  0.00  68  –2.12  –4.56  76  1.49 
    Cotton  0.73  7.71  1.34  7.88  225  9.49  9.33  465  9.50 
    Sisal  0.52  1.89  0.69  3.48  25  3.60  3.41  37  5.03 
    Sugarcane  19.22  7.66  36.04  8.18  340  8.47  9.27  718  9.80 
    Tea  1.73  2.21  2.34  3.82  34  3.80  3.74  52  5.37 
    Tobacco  0.66  10.33  1.46  10.38  23  11.39  11.98  58  12.03 
    Other crops  0.51  –0.27  0.59  1.82  17  1.76  1.22  22  3.34 
                   
Source: Results from the Tanzania DCGE and microsimulation model. Observed trends are from FAO (2009) and MINAG (2006). Initial yields and production quantities are 
results from the DCGE model after applying observed production trends for 2000–2007 to the model’s 2007 base year. 
Note: mt is million tons; ha is hectare9 
Table 4 shows average annual agricultural GDP growth after replicating crop-level production 
trends. The agricultural GDP growth rate is 4 percent under the baseline scenario for 2009–2015. This 
suggests that the agricultural growth rate reported in national accounts for 1998–2007 (i.e., 4.4 percent) is 
broadly consistent with subsector production trends. The GDP growth rate of crop agriculture, for 
example, is 4.23 percent per year under the baseline scenario, compared with the observed 4.76 percent 
reported in national accounts. Thus, in line with recent trends, agricultural growth in the baseline scenario 
is driven by strong growth in crop agriculture and more modest growth in livestock. National economic 
growth, however, is driven by a rapid expansion of industry and services. Manufacturing is partly 
constrained by slower agricultural growth, which limits upstream food processing. Agroprocessing, on the 
other hand, benefits from fast growth of cotton and tobacco. Ultimately, total GDP grows at 6.17 percent 
per year under the baseline scenario, which is broadly consistent with the 6.57 percent annual growth 
during 1998–2007.  
Table 4. GDP growth rates in the baseline and agriculture scenarios  




  Total GDP  Agricultural 
GDP 




  2009  2009  2015  2009–2015  2009–2015  2015 
              Total GDP  100.00    6.57  6.17  6.83  0.66 
Agriculture  31.84  100.00  4.40  3.97  5.87  1.90 
    Crop agriculture  22.28  69.99  4.76  4.23  6.33  2.10 
         Cereals  8.32  26.12  -  4.95  6.91  1.96 
         Root crops  3.27  10.28  -  4.42  5.87  1.45 
         Pulses & oilseeds  2.71  8.51  -  0.64  3.05  2.41 
         Horticulture  5.20  16.32  -  2.62  5.02  2.41 
         Export crops  2.79  8.76  -  7.24  9.75  2.51 
    Livestock  5.54  17.39  3.30  3.24  4.76  1.51 
    Other agriculture  4.02  12.62  4.12  3.47  4.75  1.28 
Mining  3.93    14.39  12.36  12.34  -0.02 
Manufacturing  8.84    7.60  6.93  7.71  0.78 
    Food processing  4.03    -  4.44  6.58  2.14 
    Other agroprocessing  2.65    -  8.63  8.77  0.14 
Other industry  10.39    8.25  7.05  7.02  -0.03 
Services  45.01    7.07  6.51  6.63  0.12 
             
Crop and livestock GDP  27.82  87.38    4.03  6.02  1.98 
    Western  4.45  13.97    5.43  6.76  1.33 
    Lake  5.99  18.83    3.54  5.32  1.77 
    South West  2.74  8.60    2.49  5.01  2.52 
    Highlands  2.28  7.16    4.81  7.17  2.36 
    South East  1.10  3.45    2.00  5.21  3.20 
    Eastern  3.75  11.78    4.84  6.60  1.77 
    Central  1.43  4.50    3.31  5.33  2.02 
    Northern  6.08  19.09    3.79  6.08  2.30 
             
Source: Results from the Tanzania DCGE and microsimulation model. Observed trends from MOFEA (2008). 
Note: Regional GDP only includes crops and livestock since the fisheries and forestry subsectors are not disaggregated across 
subnational regions in the model.  
The model predicts changes in households’ consumption spending on different commodities for a 
range of representative household groups (i.e., regional rural/urban farm/nonfarm households). Household 
group consumption changes in the DCGE model are passed down to individual households in the survey 10 
that make up that group. Poverty and calorie deficiency rates are then recomputed using the updated 
survey data.
8 The Tanzania model estimates that, under the baseline scenario, the increase in average per 
capita GDP by 3.59 percent each year (i.e., assuming 2.5 percent population growth) will cause the 
national poverty headcount to decline from 40.0 percent in 2007 to 31.1 by 2015 (see Figure 2).
9
Figure 2. National poverty rate under alternative agricultural growth scenarios 
 This is a 
3.09 percent annual decline in the poverty rate and so implies a poverty–growth elasticity of 0.86 (i.e., 
3.09/3.59). This is slightly above the 0.76 poverty–growth elasticity estimated by the household surveys 
for 2001–2007. However, the model’s results are reasonably consistent with the distributional changes 
observed for this period.  
 
Source: Results from the Tanzania DCGE and microsimulation model. 
The baseline scenario offers two insights into the current growth–poverty relationship in 
Tanzania. First, the level of agricultural GDP growth reported in national accounts is consistent with 
subsector-level production trends. Second, the distributional impact of the current growth path is 
consistent with the small change in inequality reported in the household surveys between 2001 and 2007 
(i.e., the model and surveys produce similar poverty–growth elasticities). These two findings suggest that 
the level of nonagricultural growth is overestimated in national accounts, the rate of poverty reduction is 
underestimated in the household surveys, or both.
10
A third finding of the baseline scenario is that the composition of economic growth, particularly 
agricultural growth, has large implications for the rate of poverty reduction. Rapid growth in traditional 
exports during 2000–2007 mainly benefited farmers in the regions where these crops are grown. 
Similarly, the expansion of certain crops, such as sugarcane and wheat, was more likely to benefit larger-
scale farmers, who in turn are less likely to be poor. In contrast, declining per capita maize production 
slowed down real per capita income growth for poorer farmers throughout the country.  
  
The unevenness of growth is evident in Table 4, which shows changes in regional agricultural 
GDP under the baseline scenario. Agricultural GDP growth is highest in the Western, Northern, and 
Eastern zones, where the country produces most of its fast-growing sugarcane, tobacco, and cotton. 
                                                   
8 See Appendix B for a more detailed description of the microsimulation module. 
9 The poverty line is defined at the 40th percentile of per capita expenditure for 2007, such that the bottom two expenditure 
quintiles of the population are defined as poor.  
10 See Appendix C for a more detailed discussion of measuring the poverty–growth relationship in Tanzania and possible 
















































Growth is slowest in the South East zone, where farmers rely more heavily on slower-growing maize, 
cashews, and poultry. Thus, although the overall level of agricultural GDP growth is high in Tanzania, its 
composition is such that it does not benefit all farmers equally, and to some extent excludes certain 
regions and many of country’s poorer farmers. Tanzania must therefore accelerate economic growth in 
sectors with stronger links to poorer households and regions if it is to significantly reduce poverty. 
   12 
4.  ACCELERATING BROAD-BASED AGRICULTURAL GROWTH  
Raising Agricultural Production 
In this section we use the DCGE model to accelerate agricultural growth in a wider range of subsectors 
than those that led the growth process during 2000–2007. More specifically, in the agriculture scenario 
we increase production in agriculture subsectors beyond what was achieved in the baseline scenario. We 
do not increase land expansion beyond its current 2 percent growth rate but rather raise productivity 
growth in individual subsectors (starting from 2010). Using maize as an example, we increase the annual-
yield growth rate from 1.45 percent under the baseline scenario to 3.94 percent under the agriculture 
scenario (see column 4 in Table 3). Accordingly, while current trends predict maize yields will rise from 
0.91 million tons per hectare (mt/ha) to 1.10 mt/ha during 2009–2015, in the agriculture scenario they rise 
to 1.24 mt/ha. This means that overall maize production increases by one million tons during 2009–2015, 
which is twice what is expected based on current trends (see column 8 in Table 3). In contrast, wheat and 
tobacco production do not grow much faster under the agriculture scenario, because these crops already 
expanded rapidly under the baseline scenario. This process of improving crop yields and increasing 
production is repeated for all agricultural subsectors.  
Annual agricultural GDP growth rises from 3.97 percent in the baseline scenario to 5.87 percent 
in the agriculture scenario during 2009–2015 (see column 5 in Table 4). Agricultural growth is now also 
more broad based, with most crops growing more rapidly. The largest improvement is in horticulture, 
where the previous decline in vegetable yields is now reversed. The growth rate of export crops now 
averages almost 10 percent per year, suggesting that there is still considerable growth potential in export 
agriculture. Average livestock GDP growth also rises by 1.5 percentage points. Faster agricultural growth 
generates strong forward linkage effects for upstream food processing, which benefits from increased 
supply of maize and livestock products for the grain milling and meat subsectors. There is, however, only 
a small increase in other agroprocessing, since tobacco refining was already growing rapidly under the 
baseline scenario. Overall, the expansion of agriculture and upstream sectors causes the growth rate of 
total national GDP to increase from 6.17 to 6.83 percent per year under the agriculture scenario.  
Agricultural growth is now more evenly distributed across regions. In the baseline scenario, 
agricultural growth was concentrated in rice, wheat, and certain traditional export crops. In the agriculture 
scenario all regions benefit from broader-based growth. For example, the South East zone was the slowest 
growing region in the baseline scenario, with annual agricultural growth of only 2 percent. This now 
increases to over 5 percent per year, driven by maize, cashews, and coconuts, which are important crops 
for this part of the country. However, regional inequality in agricultural growth still widens, since areas 
like the Northern and Highlands zones benefit from faster export crop growth, particularly for coffee, tea, 
and sisal, which are more likely to benefit larger-scale farmers (see Table 1). 
Market Constraints and Price Effects 
Increasing agricultural production causes prices to fall if demand or market constraints exist. We expect 
prices to fall for commodities (1) whose production has increased substantially, (2) that have weak 
upstream intermediate linkages in the processing subsectors, and (3) that rely heavily on domestic 
demand and do not have many export or import substitution opportunities. Figure 3 shows changes in 
market prices relative to the baseline scenario. The price of maize, millet, and vegetables falls sharply 
because these commodities have low income elasticities. This means that the share of consumer spending 
on these commodities rises slower than incomes. The demand for maize, especially in urban areas, is 
further constrained by the capacity of upstream grain milling. A similar upstream production constraint 
exists for coffee, which is exported only after processing.  
In contrast, rice and wheat have higher income elasticities than maize and millet, and the 
production of these crops does not increase as much under the agriculture scenario. Therefore, prices for 
these two crops actually rise as household agricultural revenues increase. Tobacco and cotton production 13 
also increase only slightly from their current trends, and their export-orientation means access to large 
foreign markets and lower demand constraints. Model results therefore reveal severe market constraints 
and suggest that limited upstream agroprocessing capacity is a binding constraint to sustaining 
agricultural growth, both for food staples and certain, more export-oriented crops. 
Figure 3. Relative producer price changes under the agriculture scenario 
   
Source: Results from the Tanzania DCGE and microsimulation model. 
Impacts on Poverty and Caloric Availability 
The acceleration of agricultural growth to almost 6 percent per year and the spillover effects into 
agroprocessing causes poverty to decline by a further 4.51 percentage points by 2015. This is shown in 
Figure 2, where the share of Tanzania’s population under the poverty line is 26.61 percent by 2015 under 
the agriculture scenario, compared with 31.12 percent under the baseline scenario. Thus, taking 2.5 
percent annual population growth into account, achieving the productivity improvements in Table 2 lifts 
an additional 1.74 million people above the poverty line by 2015. The acceleration of broad-based 
agricultural growth also strengthens the growth–poverty relationship in Tanzania. For example, the 
additional 2 percentage points of agricultural growth each year causes the poverty–growth elasticity to 
rise from 0.86 under the baseline scenario to 1.36 under the agriculture scenario. This is a result of per 
capita GDP now growing at 4.33 percent per year during 2009–2015 and the poverty rate declining by 
5.89 percent per year (i.e., 5.89/4.33). Since we only increase agricultural growth in the agriculture 
scenario, the increase in the poverty–growth elasticity relative to the baseline scenario implies that broad-
based agricultural growth is more pro-poor than nonagricultural growth. 
All household groups in the DCGE model benefit from accelerated agricultural growth (see 
column 4 in Table 5). Not surprisingly, the rural poverty rate declines substantially in the agriculture 
scenario (i.e., by 4.96 percentage points). Poverty reduction is largest in the Northern and Central zones, 
where poorer households benefit from stronger growth in millet and livestock, and to a lesser extent from 
out-grower export crops such as coffee. Improved plantain, vegetables, and pulses production also favors 
poorer households in the Lake zone. In contrast, the drop in poverty is smaller in the South West zone. 
These households rely more heavily on nonfarm incomes, so their incomes are less affected by increased 






























































agricultural revenues, they do benefit from falling consumer prices. Even urban nonfarm households in 
the highest expenditure quintile spend about half of their incomes on purchased foods. More importantly, 
lower expenditure quintile nonfarm households spend as much as three-quarters of their income on 
agricultural products. Forward consumption linkages therefore explain why the urban poverty rate falls by 
2.62 percentage points under the agriculture scenario. 
Agricultural growth also benefits household calorie intake by increasing incomes and food 
availability in the country. As a result, the share of the national population consuming less than 2,550 
calories per day falls by 4.15 percentage points, which is over and above the 4.23 percentage point 
reduction already occurring in the baseline scenario (see column 8 in Table 5). The initial elasticity 
between economic growth and the calorie deficiency rate was 0.681 in the baseline scenario (i.e., a 2.44 
percent annual decline in the deficiency rate divided by 3.59 percent per capita GDP growth). Model 
results show that accelerating broad-based agricultural growth greatly enhances the growth–calorie 
relationship, with the elasticity rising to 1.48 in the agriculture scenario, driven primarily by increased 
production and consumption of calorie-rich maize, pulses, and millet. 15 
Table 5. Changes in poverty headcount and calorie deficiency rates in the model 
  Poverty headcount rate (%)  Calorie deficiency rate (%) 
  Initial 
poverty rate  






Final calorie deficiency rate   Change from 
baseline 
(% point) 








  2007  2015  2015  2015  2007  2015  2015  2015 
                  National  40.00  31.12  26.61  –4.51  23.56  19.33  15.18  –4.15 
  Rural  44.74  35.00  30.04  –4.96  22.30  18.16  13.97  –4.19 
  Urban  20.16  14.80  12.17  –2.62  28.82  24.23  20.25  –3.98 
                         
Nonfarm  24.93  19.43  16.40  –3.04  30.05  26.13  20.67  –5.46 
                         
Farm  43.46  33.79  28.94  –4.85  22.07  17.78  13.92  –3.85 
  Western  39.65  27.70  23.61  –4.10  14.78  10.17  7.51  –2.66 
  Lake  50.46  41.87  36.54  –5.33  27.38  22.80  19.95  –2.85 
  South West  36.11  31.31  29.36  –1.95  17.78  15.45  12.71  –2.74 
  Highlands  42.21  25.04  20.14  –4.90  20.20  16.27  12.81  –3.46 
  South East  37.58  25.46  21.29  –4.17  23.85  19.15  14.16  –5.00 
  Eastern  37.65  29.95  26.39  –3.56  27.67  23.04  18.99  –4.05 
  Central  58.20  47.27  40.80  –6.46  22.66  15.41  11.71  –3.70 
  Northern  40.47  33.71  26.62  –7.09  23.76  21.07  13.84  –7.23 
                 
Source: Results from the Tanzania DCGE and microsimulation model.  
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The distribution of changes in nutritional outcomes differs from that of poverty outcomes. Most 
striking perhaps is the larger reduction in the calorie deficiency rate for urban nonfarm households 
compared with rural households. Urban households initially have a higher calorie deficiency rate than 
rural households. This may seem puzzling since urban households typically earn higher incomes. This 
relates partly to the fact that urban households face a higher cost of living than their rural counterparts.
11
Nevertheless, increased production and falling prices for key food staples appear to greatly 
improve urban households’ nutritional status. Even though rural households benefit from the same 
declines in prices, lower prices also mean lower returns to agricultural activities and a decline in rural 
incomes. As net consumers of agricultural and food products, urban households therefore benefit more 
than rural households. Furthermore, while all households benefit from increased maize availability, urban 
nonfarm households, compared with rural households, also derive a larger share of their calorie intake 
from pulses, vegetables, and livestock products. These crops grow particularly fast under the agriculture 
scenario.  
 
However, it may also reflect an underestimation of urban household caloric availability, which is related 
to the fact that these households consume more food from street vendors and restaurants. Such 
expenditures are more likely to be misreported; in addition, attaching a caloric content to prepared foods 
is difficult.  
In summary, accelerating agricultural growth greatly strengthens both the growth–poverty and 
growth–nutrition relationship in Tanzania. This is driven by the broader base of agricultural growth, 
which allows the production of key calorie-laden food crops, such as maize and millet, to expand. These 
crops are also more widespread in Tanzania, implying greater participation of smallholder farmers in a 
larger number of regions within the country. Ultimately, our model results indicate that agricultural 
growth is substantially more pro-poor than nonagricultural growth, as evidenced by the large increase in 
the overall poverty–growth elasticity in the agriculture scenario. At the same time it has the ability to 
improve caloric availability due to increased availability of food at lower prices across the spectrum of 
households.  
                                                   
11 For example, our estimates show that urban households in the bottom 20 percent of caloric availability obtain an average 
of 1,538 kilocalories at a cost of TSh 207 per day, while rural households spend TSh 125 for a similar amount of calories. Price 
variations also explain the differences in the composition of caloric availability across urban and rural food-insecure households 
(see columns 3 to 6 in Table 2). 17 
5.  COMPARING ALTERNATIVE SOURCES OF AGRICULTURAL GROWTH  
In this section we compare alternative sources of growth in terms of their effectiveness in reducing 
poverty, improving households’ calorie intake, and stimulating overall economic growth in the country. 
Agricultural subsectors can have different impacts on development outcomes for a variety of reasons. 
First, certain subsectors are already large, so small-yield improvements can have large implications for 
agricultural and national economic growth. Second, smaller subsectors may have large growth potentials 
and therefore can contribute to overall growth through their rapid expansion. Third, some sectors are 
more effective at reducing poverty because either they have stronger linkages to poorer households’ 
income-generation process or they produce products that poorer households consume intensively. 
Fourthly and similarly, some subsectors produce products that are particularly important for households’ 
nutritional status, such as those that are cost-effective sources of calories and other minerals, those that 
are consumed intensively by nutrient-deficient households, or both. Finally, some agricultural subsectors 
have stronger linkages to upstream processing, so expanding production in these subsectors generates 
more growth outside of agriculture. We consider these five criteria when prioritizing subsectors. 
Table 6 presents poverty–growth elasticities for individual subsectors (see columns 1 and 2). 
Each subsector grew at a different rate in the agriculture scenario. To produce comparable indicators, we 
normalize elasticities by assuming that all of the additional per capita GDP generated in the agriculture 
scenario comes entirely from each individual subsector (i.e., we neutralize size effects). The three highest 
normalized poverty–growth elasticities are for growth led by maize, sorghum/millet, and root crops. This 
is because these crops are important expenditure items for households just below the poverty line. They 
are also crops that are grown more intensively by poorer farm households. In contrast, the elasticity for 
rice- and wheat-led growth is lower, because these crops are grown in specific parts of the country and, in 
the case of wheat, by larger-scale farmers who are less likely to be poor.  
Table 6. Poverty–growth and calorie–growth elasticities under alternative growth scenarios 
  Percentage change in poverty or calorie index caused by 1 percent 
growth in total GDP led by the following crops and subsectors 
  Poverty headcount  Calorie deficiency headcount 
  Modeled  Normalized  Modeled  Normalized 
          Baseline scenario  –0.863  -  –0.681  - 
Agriculture scenario  –1.361  –1.361  –1.479  –1.479 
          Maize-led growth  –1.088  –1.494  –1.105  –1.868 
Sorghum- and millet-led 
growth  –0.965  –1.472  –0.817  –1.492 
Rice- and wheat-led growth  –0.927  –1.346  –0.708  –0.888 
Roots-led growth  –0.959  –1.446  –0.756  –1.136 
Pulses- and oilseeds-led 
growth  –1.022  –1.416  –1.010  –1.825 
Horticulture-led growth  –1.009  –1.357  –0.777  –1.007 
Export crop–led growth  –0.999  –1.411  –0.718  –0.831 
Livestock-led growth  –1.003  –1.322  –0.681  –0.680 
Other agriculture-led growth  –0.964  –1.353  –0.727  –0.905 
         
Source: Results from the Tanzania DCGE and microsimulation model. 
Note: Normalized elasticities assume that the increase in GDP in the agriculture now comes entirely from individual sectors (i.e., 
the elasticities assume the same absolute change in per capita GDP). 
Table 6 also shows normalized calorie deficiency–growth elasticities. Model results indicate that 
maize and sorghum/millet are two of the more effective crops at improving household calorie intake per 
unit of growth. However, root crops are less effective than pulses/oilseeds, since the latter have higher 18 
calorie contents and are a more important source of calories for both rural and urban households. 
Livestock has the lowest elasticity in spite of the high calorie content of meat products. This is because 
livestock products are an expensive source of calories and are consumed less intensively than other 
calorie sources by lower-income households. 
Table 7 measures each sector’s contribution to agricultural and total GDP and compares the 
economywide growth-linkage effects. For instance, maize-led growth generates TSh 237.8 billion 
additional agricultural GDP (measured in 2007 prices). Total GDP increases by more than this amount 
due to backward and forward production and consumption linkages. For example, higher maize 
production reduces input prices for grain milling and for animal feedstock in the meat-processing sectors. 
It also increases households’ real incomes that are then spent on nonagricultural commodities. Total GDP 
increases by TSh 262.6 billion, which means that for every shilling increase in agricultural GDP driven by 
maize-led growth, there is an additional 0.10 shilling increase in nonagricultural GDP (i.e., a multiplier 
effect of 1.10). These results suggest that livestock, pulses/oilseeds, and sorghum/millet have the largest 
growth-linkage effects. Livestock has strong linkages to upstream meat processing, which is the largest of 
the food-processing subsectors. In contrast, some export crops are exported without much processing, 
such as tea and cashew nuts. This lowers these crops’ upstream growth linkages. Finally, the 
comparatively low linkage effect of maize highlights its upstream processing constraints, which explains 
why the market price of maize falls dramatically in the agriculture sector. However, even though maize 
has smaller linkage effects, its initial size means that it still contributes the most to total GDP.  
Table 7. Economywide growth-linkage effect of agriculture under the agriculture scenario 





Sectoral growth rates, 
2009-2015 (%) 
Additional GDP relative to 
baseline (2007 bil. TSh) 
Growth- 
linkage 




Total GDP  Agric. GDP 
  2015  2015   
  (1)  (2)  (1) / (2) 
              Maize-led growth  893  2.82  5.69  262.6  237.8  1.10 
Sorghum- and millet-led growth  181  3.83  4.77  41.6  34.4  1.21 
Rice- and wheat-led growth  664  7.78  7.83  3.0  2.5  1.19 
Roots-led growth  679  4.42  4.98  38.1  32.5  1.17 
Pulses- and oilseeds-led growth  510  0.64  2.60  179.6  140.0  1.28 
Horticulture-led growth  1,030  2.62  4.44  188.4  160.8  1.17 
Export crop–led growth  581  7.24  9.74  132.7  115.4  1.15 
Livestock-led growth  1,121  3.24  4.51  200.5  117.7  1.70 
Other agriculture-led growth  821  3.47  4.86  85.7  80.1  1.07 
             
Source: Results from the Tanzania DCGE and microsimulation model. 
Figure 4 summarizes the findings. The three subsectors with the highest poverty–growth and 
calorie–growth elasticities are placed inside the circles labeled poverty effect and nutrition effect, 
respectively. Similarly, we identify the three sectors contributing the most to total GDP growth, which 
takes into account the subsector’s initial size, growth potential, and economywide linkage effect. Maize is 
included in the top three subsectors for all three criteria, suggesting that this crop should be afforded a 
high priority in the government’s agricultural investment plans. Sorghum and millet, while relatively 
small compared with maize, rank highly on both on the criteria of reducing poverty and improving 
household caloric availability. However, it should be noted that maize, sorghum, and millet were 
identified as facing severe market constraints (see Figure 3). Therefore, to facilitate a sustained expansion 
of production these crops, it is essential to enhance their upstream linkages and domestic market 
opportunities. 
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Source: Results from the Tanzania DCGE and microsimulation model. 
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6.  CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS  
Tanzania’s growth performance has been commendable, with national GDP growing at over 6 percent per 
year since 2000. However, rapid growth has led to neither substantial reductions in poverty nor 
improvements in household’s nutritional status. This has raised concerns about a possible decoupling of 
economic growth, poverty, and nutrition. Results from a regional and dynamic CGE model of Tanzania 
indicate that the country’s low poverty–growth elasticity is primarily a result of the current structure of 
agricultural growth, which favors larger-scale production of rice, wheat, and traditional export crops. 
Accelerating agricultural growth in a wider range of subsectors than those currently leading the growth 
process is needed to strengthen the effectiveness of growth at reducing poverty and improving the 
availability of calories in households.  
Evidence for Tanzania suggests that investing in research and extension has large, positive 
impacts on agricultural growth and household incomes (Fan et al. 2005). Econometric estimates suggest 
that every TSh 1 million spent on agricultural research (in 1999 prices) increases household incomes by 
TSh 12.5 million and lifts 40 people above the poverty line. Moreover, the returns to agricultural research 
are found to have higher impacts than similar investments in education and rural roads, both of which also 
have positive returns. Despite these high returns on investment, however, the government of Tanzania 
spends only a small share of its budget on agriculture. Allocations to agriculture averaged only 3 percent 
of the total budget during 2004–2007—a share that has also deteriorated over time (MOFEA 2008). 
Moreover, spending on research and extension comprises less than 15 percent of the agricultural budget. 
Additional spending on agriculture, particularly on research and extension, is therefore needed, along with 
improved efficiency in the way the ministry of agriculture spends its budget allocation.  
Model results identified maize as a priority sector for investment. Empirical evidence suggests 
that maize yields in Tanzania are rising, thanks to the provision of extension services and farmers’ 
increased use of improved inputs, especially fertilizer (Nkonya et al. 1997). Supporting investments in 
rural education are also found to encourage greater adoption of improved technologies. However, much of 
Tanzania’s maize production is rain fed, thus making the country highly susceptible to extreme climate 
events and high market price volatility. In this regard, evidence suggests that lowering transaction costs 
through investing in rural roads would reduce price volatility in Tanzania and also increase farm gate 
prices, thereby enhancing returns to maize farming (Kilima et al. 2008). Our model results also identified 
severe market constraints facing maize production in Tanzania. Expanding upstream milling capacity 
would strengthen famers’ access to urban consumers, who demand more processed maize, thus relieving 
some of the downward pressure on maize prices. Similarly, model results also suggest that opportunities 
exist for domestic producers to substitute for imported cereals.  
Finally, the model results provided two insights into the current inconsistencies between the rapid 
economic growth reported in national accounts and the small improvements in poverty and caloric 
availability from the household surveys. First, national accounts estimate that agricultural growth is found 
to be consistent with subsector-level production trends. Secondly, the model and surveys produced similar 
estimates of the poverty–growth elasticity, suggesting that the structure of growth is consistent with only 
small changes in inequality. These two findings suggest that the level of nonagricultural growth is 
overestimated in national accounts, the rate of poverty reduction is underestimated in the household 
surveys, or both. Regardless of these inconsistencies, however, the model results confirm the weak 
relationship between economic growth, poverty, and nutrition in Tanzania. They underline the importance 
of encouraging broader-based economic growth in the future, with the stronger role for agriculture and 
food crops in particular.  
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APPENDIX A:  SPECIFICATION OF THE DCGE MODEL 
The Core General Equilibrium Model  
Table A.1 presents the equations of a simple, closed-economy dynamic computable general equilibrium 
(DCGE) model illustrating how sector growth is linked to market prices and household incomes in our 
analysis. The model is recursive dynamic and can therefore be separated into a static “within-period” 
component wherein producers and consumers maximize profits and utility, and a dynamic “between-
period” component wherein the model is updated based on the demographic model and previous period 
results, thereby reflecting changes in population, labor supply, and the accumulation of capital and 
technology.  
In the static component of the model, producers in each sector s and region r produce a level of 
output Q in time period t by employing the factors of production F under constant returns to scale 
(exogenous productivity α) and fixed production technologies (fixed factor shares δ) (equation 1). Profit 
maximization implies that factor payments W are equal to average production revenues (equation 2). 
Labor supply L, land supply N, and capital supply K are fixed within a given time period, implying full 
employment of factor resources. Land and labor market equilibrium is defined at the regional level, so 
land and labor is mobile across sectors, but wages and rental rates vary by region (equation 6). National 
capital market equilibrium implies that capital is mobile across both sectors and regions and earns a 
national rental rate (i.e., regional capital returns are equalized) (equation 7). 
Factor incomes are distributed to households in each region using fixed income shares based on 
households’ initial factor endowments θ (equation 3). Total household incomes Y are then either saved 
(based on marginal propensities to save υ) or spent on consumption C (according to marginal budget 
shares β) (equation 4). Savings are collected in a national savings pool and used to finance investment 
demand I (i.e., savings-driven investment closure) (equation 5). Finally, a single price P equilibrates 
demand and supply in national product markets, thus avoiding the necessity of modeling interregional 
trade flows (equation 8).  
Table A.1. Simple CGE model equations 
Static model equations   
  Production function        
  Factor payments    (2) 
  Household income    (3) 
  Consumption demand    (4) 
  Investment demand    (5) 
  Labor market equilibrium    f is labor  (6) 
  Land market equilibrium    f is land  (7) 
  Capital market equilibrium    f is capital  (8) 
  Product market equilibrium    (9) 22 
Table A.1. Continued 
Recursive dynamic equations   
  Labor supply    f is labor  (10) 
  Land expansion    f is land  (11) 
  Capital accumulation    f is capital  (12) 
  Technical change    f is labor  (13) 
        Subscripts  Endogenous variables   
f  Factor groups (land, labor, and capital)  D  Household consumption demand quantity 
h  Household groups  F  Factor demand quantity 
m  GCMs and emission scenarios  I  Investment demand quantity 
r  Regions (agroclimatic)  K  National capital supply 
s  Economic sectors  L  Regional labor supply 
t  Time periods  P  Commodity price 
Static model exogenous parameters    Q  Output quantity 
α  Production shift parameter (factor productivity)  W  Average factor return 
β  Household average budget share  Y  Total household income 
δ  Factor input share parameter  Dynamic updating exogenous parameters   
θ  Household share of factor income    Hicks neutral rate of technical change 
ρ  Investment commodity expenditure share  κ  Base price per unit of capital stock 
υ  Household marginal propensity to save  π  Capital depreciation rate 
    σ  Long-term labor supply growth rate 
      Long-term land expansion rate 
       
The model’s variables and parameters are calibrated to observed data from a regional social 
accounting matrix (SAM) that captures the initial equilibrium structure of the Tanzanian economy in 
2007. Parameters are then adjusted over time to reflect demographic and economic changes and the model 
is recalculated for a series of new equilibriums for the eight-year period 2007–2015. Three dynamic 
adjustments occur between periods: changes in land and labor supply, capital accumulation, and technical 
change. 
Between periods the model is updated to reflect long-term growth rates in land supply N and 
labor supply L. These are imposed through the parameters σ and   (equations 9 and 10), which remain 
unchanged across simulations and time periods. For capital supply K, the model endogenously determines 
the national rate of accumulation (equation 11). The level of investment I from the previous period is 
converted into new capital stocks using a fixed capital price κ. This is added to previous capital stocks 
after applying a fixed long-term rate of depreciation π. New capital is allocated to regions and sectors 
endogenously to equalize capital returns. Finally, the model captures total factor productivity through the 
production function’s shift parameter α. The rate of technical change γ is determined exogenously.  
To reach the production targets in our simulations, we increase the rate of technical change γ in a 
particular sector. This increases production of this product Q (equation 1), as well as factor demand F and 
returns W (equation 2) depending on relative factor intensities of production δ. Household incomes Y also 
rise at differing rates, depending on their relative factor endowments θ (equation 3). The increase in 
consumer demand D depends on the composition of household baskets β (equation 4). The overall 
increase in demand is then moderated in product markets through changing price P (equation 9). 
Similarly, increased factor demand is constrained by total factor availability through factor returns W 
(equations 6, 7, and 8). The results of the model are therefore largely determined by the structural 23 
characteristics of the economy (e.g., β, δ, and θ), which are empirically estimated from industrial and 
household surveys. Given these characteristics, the model determines how production affects market 
prices and household incomes within a consistent economywide framework.  
Extensions in the Full Tanzania DCGE Model 
The above model illustrates how we link economic growth to household incomes. However, the full 
Tanzania model drops many of the assumptions implicit in this simplified model. Constant elasticity of 
substitution production functions replace Cobb–Douglas functions to allow factor substitution based on 
relative factor prices (i.e., δ is no longer fixed). The full model identifies 58 sectors (see Table A.2), and 
agriculture is disaggregated across 20 subnational regions (see Figure A.1). Intermediate demand in each 
sector, which was excluded from the simple model, is now determined by fixed technology coefficients 
(i.e., Leontief). Based on the Household Budget Survey (HBS) 2000–2001 (NBS 2002), labor markets are 
further segmented across four skill groups: (1) illiterate or uneducated workers, (2) workers with primary 
education, (3) workers with some secondary schooling, and (4) workers with secondary or higher 
schooling. Agricultural land and livestock capital in each region is further divided across small-scale and 
large-scale farms based on the 2002–2003 Agricultural Sample Survey (MINAG 2004). All factors are 
assumed to be fully employed, and capital is immobile across sectors. New capital from past investment is 
allocated to regions and sectors according to profit rate differentials under a “putty-clay” specification. 
Figure A.1. Regions and zones in the Tanzania DCGE model 
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Table A.2. Sectors and regions in the Tanzania DCGE model 
Sector and zone grouping  Detailed sectors or administrative regions 
    Agriculture  Maize, sorghum, millet, rice, wheat and barley, cassava, other roots, pulses, 
coconuts, oilseeds, plantains, fruits, vegetables, coffee, cashew nuts, cotton, sisal, 
sugarcane, tea, tobacco, other cash crops, cattle, poultry, other livestock, fisheries, 
forestry 
Agroprocessing  Meat and fish processing, maize milling, rice milling, other milling, other food 
processing, sugar refining, tobacco processing, beverages, textiles and clothing, 
wood and paper products 
Other industry  Mining, basic chemicals, fertilizer, petroleum products, rubber and plastics, 
nonmetallic minerals, metal products, machinery and equipment, other 
manufacturing, electricity and gas, water supply, construction 
Services  Trade services, hotels and catering, transportation, communications, financial 
services, business and real estate, public administration, education, health, other 
services 
    Western  Kigoma, Shinyanga, Tabora 
Lake  Kagera, Mara, Mwanza 
South West  Mbeya, Rukwa 
Highlands  Iringa, Ruvuma 
South East  Lindi, Mtwara 
Eastern  Coast, Dar es Salaam, Morogoro 
Central  Dodoma, Singida 
Northern  Arusha, Kilimanjaro, Manyara, Tanga 
   
The full model still assumes national product markets. However, international trade is captured 
by allowing production and consumption to shift imperfectly between domestic and foreign markets, 
depending on the relative prices of imports, exports, and domestic goods. Initial trade patterns are taken 
from FAO (2009) and MOFEA (2008). Since Tanzania’s economy is small, world prices are assumed to 
be fixed, and the current account balance is maintained by a flexible real exchange rate (i.e., the price 
index of tradable-to-nontradable goods). Production and trade elasticities are from Dimaranan (2006).  
Households maximize a Stone–Geary utility function so that a linear expenditure system 
determines consumption with nonunitary income elasticities. Income elasticities were econometrically 
estimated using the HBS 2000–2001. Households are disaggregated across rural/urban and farm/nonfarm 
groups and by per capita expenditure quintiles. Farm households are further split across the 20 
subnational regions. Table A.3 provides a broad summary of the demographic and production structure of 
the model. There are a total of 110 household groupings in the full DCGE model. These household groups 
pay taxes to the government based on fixed direct and indirect tax rates. Tax revenues finance exogenous 
recurrent spending, resulting in an endogenous fiscal deficit. In summary, the full Tanzania DCGE model 
captures the detailed sector and labor market structure of Tanzania’s economy and the linkages between 
production, employment, and household incomes. 25 


















Eastern  Central  North-
ern    Urban  Rural 
                          Population (1,000)  31,683  3,590  2,300  25,793  5,035  5,384  2,724  2,139  1,690  2,251  2,647  3,923 
Number of households  6,393  878  482  5,033  841  918  596  507  431  449  562  729 
Household size  4.96  4.09  4.78  5.12  5.99  5.86  4.57  4.22  3.92  5.01  4.71  5.38 
                                      Per capita expenditure 
(US$)  329  687  356  277  217  235  262  330  355  433  207  316 
Poverty rate (%)  40.00  14.95  39.16  43.42  39.65  50.25  36.11  42.21  37.58  37.65  58.20  40.47 
Poor population (1,000)  12,673  537  901  11,200  1,996  2,706  984  903  635  848  1,540  1,588 
Share of poor (%)  100.00  4.23  7.11  88.37  15.75  21.35  7.76  7.12  5.01  6.69  12.15  12.53 
                                      Harvest area (1,000 ha)   -  -  -   8,209  1,107  1,796  654  423  605  1,321  702  1,602 
                                      Average farm land (ha)   -   -   -  1.63  1.32  1.96  1.10  0.83  1.40  2.94  1.25  2.20 
   Maize   -   -   -  0.53  0.36  0.48  0.42  0.42  0.27  0.97  0.52  0.89 
   Sorghum and millet   -   -   -  0.18  0.17  0.30  0.06   -   -  0.24  0.52  0.07 
   Other cereals   -   -   -  0.12  0.11  0.11   -  0.09   -  0.62   -  0.14 
   Roots   -   -   -  0.24  0.16  0.43  0.16  0.08  0.82  0.18   -  0.13 
   Pulses and oilseeds   -   -   -  0.29  0.26  0.30  0.26  0.04  0.16  0.63  0.21  0.46 
   Horticulture   -   -   -  0.13  0.04  0.18  0.13  0.08  0.03  0.23   -  0.30 
   Export crops   -   -   -  0.13  0.21  0.16  0.07  0.13  0.13  0.07   -  0.21 
                          
Source: Authors’ calculations using Tanzania DCGE and microsimulation model, which is based on MINAG (2004, 2006) and HBS 2000–2001 (NBS 2002). 
Note: Population data is from HBS 2000–2001 (NBS 2002). Per capita expenditure is based on consumption spending from the 2007 SAM. The poverty line identifies the bottom 




APPENDIX B:  MEASURING POVERTY AND NUTRITION OUTCOMES  
The DCGE model endogenously estimates the impact of sector growth patterns on household incomes 
and consumption patterns. There are 110 representative household groups in the model, disaggregated 
across 20 regions; five income quintiles; and rural/urban, farm/nonfarm groups. Each of the 
approximately 22,000 households questioned in HBS 2000–2001 (NBS 2002) are linked top-down to 
their corresponding representative household in the DCGE model. This permits an evaluation of changes 
in poverty and nutrition (i.e., caloric availability) at the household level. While this approach to 
microlevel modeling assumes constant within-group income distributions, it permits a more nuanced 
interpretation of income/nutrition changes within household groups relative to some predefined poverty or 
calorie line.  
Poverty Module 
The poverty module applies percentage changes in representative households’ real consumption levels of 
each expenditure item to the corresponding individual households in the survey. Thus, for each 
simulation, a new household-specific level of per capita expenditure is estimated, which then serves as a 
welfare measure in standard poverty analysis. Thus, for each simulation, changes in poverty measures are 
calculated on the assumption that gains in per capita expenditures are shared equally among the 
household members. For our analysis we assume a per capita poverty line equal to the 40th percentile of 
the per capita expenditure (approximately TSh 6,736 per month in 2000 prices).  
Nutrition Module 
The nutrition module operates in a manner similar to the poverty module in that consumption changes in 
the DCGE model are linked top-down to micromodel household data. The nutrition module, however, 
only considers changes in the consumption quantities of food products. This in turn permits an evaluation 
of the change in caloric availability at the household level. Caloric availability is compared with a 
measure of the daily energy requirement of each household (a “calorie line”) based on its size and 
demographic structure (i.e., age and gender composition). Households below this requirement are deemed 
“calorie deficient.” The nutrition module allows us to determine which households move above the 
calorie line in each model simulation.  
Adding a nutrition module to the microsimulation component of the DCGE model requires 
additional sets of information. The first is a detailed account of food consumption quantities measured in 
standard units (i.e., 100 g or 100 ml). This is available in HBS 2000–2001, where households reported 
both food quantities and the values of these food items. The second set of information is the calorie 
content of different food items. Detailed, Tanzania-specific information is drawn from Lukmanji et al. 
(2008). A third requirement is to define adult equivalence scales to account for the different numbers of 
calories per day that men, women, and children require. Equivalence scales were drawn from the United 
Nations University (UNU), World Health Organization (WHO), and Food and Agriculture Organization 
of the United Nations (FAO) (UNU, WHO, and FAO, 2004) (see Table B.1). 
Table B.1. Caloric equivalence scales (measured relative to adult males, aged 19 to 59) 
   Age group 
  0–2  3–4  5–6  7–8  9–10  11–12  13–14  15–18  19–59  60+ 
Male  0.32  0.47  0.56  0.55  0.64  0.76  0.90  1.09  1.00  0.82 
Female  0.29  0.44  0.51  0.65  0.75  0.89  1.05  1.28  1.20  0.98 
Source: Derived from UNU, WHO, and FAO (2004), as reported in Smith and Subandoro (2007).  
   27 
Together, this information was used to calculate the total calories available to each household in 
the survey. This can then be compared with calorie lines of 2,200 or 2,550 kilocalories per adult 
equivalent per day. These represent the minimum energy requirement for basal metabolic function and 
light office work, respectively. The calorie line of 2,200 kilocalories is consistent with NBS (2002) and 
the official food poverty line, and 2,550 kilocalories is consistent with the calorie line used in the World 
Bank (2009) study. 
Limitations and Data Cleaning  
Using household expenditure survey data to estimate caloric availability has certain limitation. First, these 
surveys are not typically designed to capture information on calorie consumption. Incorrect reporting 
may, among other things, relate to incorrect valuation of goods consumed, incorrect estimation of weight 
or volume measurements, and purchased foods not necessarily being consumed by household members 
themselves (see Smith and Subandoro 2007), hence the reference to caloric availability as opposed to 
caloric intake.  
Consequently it is necessary to check for data inconsistencies and identify outliers that skew 
estimates of average caloric availability. One significant indication of outliers is a large deviation in the 
implicit price per calorie faced by a particular household for a specific commodity from the median or 
average price. Such price outliers may be indicative of an incorrect monetary valuation of foods 
purchased or an incorrect estimate of the weight or volume of such goods. Households may also simply 
over- or underreport the amount of food purchased for actual consumption by household members, and 
consequently caloric availability is lower or higher than expected given a household’s income level. A 
further area of misreporting is when farming households incorrectly report expenditures on seeds as food 
expenditure.  
We correct the caloric availability data in three ways. First, in households where the reported 
commodity-specific price per calorie is 50 percent or more above comparative median price in the region 
(Dar es Salaam, other urban areas, and rural areas are grouped for this purpose), the price per calorie is 
capped and calories available from a given level of expenditure are recalculated. Secondly, we assume 
that a household cannot obtain more than its daily needs from a single commodity (e.g., if daily calories 
from milled maize exceed 2,200 kilocalories, then these are capped at 2,200 kilocalories). Finally, we 
impute a new caloric availability level for households that are classified as calorie deficient yet report 
expenditure levels of more than 1-½ times the official region-specific food poverty line. We also impute 
caloric availability values for households reportedly consuming more than three times the daily caloric 
requirement of 2,200 kilocalories per adult equivalent per day.
12 Where imputed values once again exceed 
6,600 kilocalories per day, the calories are capped at three times the daily limit.
13
                                                   
12 A simple ordinary least squares imputation model is set up. Independent variables included are adult equivalent per capita 
expenditure, the share of the household budget spent on food, regional dummies (to account for regional food price differences), 
a farming household dummy variable, and a dummy for female-headed households. 
  
13 Endurance athletes typically require about 6,000 kilocalories per day; hence, 6,600 kilocalories is truly an upper bound. 28 
APPENDIX C:  COMPARING ALTERNATIVE POVERTY–GROWTH  
ELASTICITIES IN TANZANIA 
Poverty–growth elasticities (PGE) show the percentage decline in poverty from a 1 percent increase in per 
capita GDP. A key component of GDP is private consumption, which is estimated in national accounts 
and captured by household expenditure surveys (e.g., HBS 2000–2001). National accounts estimate 
private consumption differently from household surveys (see Ravallion 2001). Consumption is larger in 
national accounts because it includes a wider range of products, but surveys are less likely to sample 
households at the top of the income distribution. However, discrepancies may arise from estimation errors 
because national accounts treats private consumption as a residual between GDP at factor cost and other 
components of GDP at market prices. Over time, discrepancies may widen, and so household surveys can 
provide a check on consumption trends in national accounts. 
Table C.1 shows alternative estimates of PGEs for Tanzania. According to national accounts, per 
capita GDP grew at 1.06 percent per year during 1992–2001, while the household survey estimated an 
annual decline in poverty of 0.86 percent (not percentage points). This gives a PGE of 0.82 (i.e., 
0.86/1.06). However, per capita consumption growth was higher in the surveys (i.e., 1.71 compared with 
1.15 percent). If the surveys are more accurate than the national accounts and we assume similar 
deviations in other components of GDP at market prices, then per capita GDP would have grown faster 
during 1992–2001, at 1.53 percent per year. This gives a lower PGE of 0.57 (i.e., 0.86/1.53). In other 
words, if the surveys were more accurate at measuring growth than the national accounts were, then 
growth was less effective at reducing poverty during than the 1990s than national accounts suggest. The 
actual PGE may well lie somewhere between these two alternative estimates. 
The situation is reversed during the 2000s. National accounts estimate that per capita GDP grew 
at 3.99 percent per year, which is well above our estimate of 1.32 percent per year from the household 
surveys. The household surveys estimate that poverty declined by 1.01 percent per year during 2001–
2007. This means that the PGE varies from a low 0.25 based on national accounts to 0.76 based on survey 
estimates of GDP growth. The difference arises because either national accounts overestimate or the 
household surveys underestimate GDP growth. Understanding these differences is important because they 
imply different trends in the effectiveness of economic growth to reduce poverty. Estimates of PGEs 
based on national accounts suggest a deterioration of the growth–poverty relationship from the 1990s to 
the 2000s, whereas the household surveys suggest the opposite.  
Table C.1. Alternative estimates of poverty–growth elasticities 
    1990s  2000s  Simulations 
























  Per capita growth rates (%)             
1    Total GDP  1.06  1.53  3.99  1.32  3.59  4.33 
    Consumption  1.15  1.71  1.79  0.80  2.29  3.56 
               
2 
Poverty (P0) growth rate 
(%)  –0.86  –0.86  –1.01  –1.01  –3.09  –5.89 
     Initial rate (%)  38.6  38.60  35.7  35.70  40.02  38.31 
     Final rate (%)  35.7  35.70  33.6  33.60  31.12  26.61 
                  Poverty–growth elasticities              
    Total GDP ([2]/[1])  –0.82  –0.57  –0.25  –0.76  –0.86  –1.36 
Source: Authors’ calculations using MOFEA (2008), World Bank (2008 and 2009), and results from the Tanzania DCGE and 
microsimulation model. 29 
Note: Total per capita GDP growth rates for the household surveys (columns 2 and 4) are estimated assuming the same deviations 
for all expenditure components of GDP at market prices as reported for private consumption. 
In our analysis we simulate the detailed sector growth rates reported in official agricultural 
production data. Our results indicate that agriculture’s GDP growth rate in national accounts is broadly 
consistent with production trends at the crop and subsector levels (i.e., our estimated agricultural GDP 
growth rate for 2007–2015 in the baseline scenario is similar to the one reported in national accounts for 
1998–2007 to which the baseline scenario is calibrated). Thus, if agricultural GDP growth is indicative of 
other sectors’ performance and if the economy has not had very large structural changes during 1998–
2007, then our model results suggest that economic growth was not as low as the household surveys 
report. Conversely, our baseline scenario produces PGEs similar to those estimated using the household 
surveys. If this result is accurate, then it suggests that the distribution of growth during 2001–2007 may 
have been appropriately captured by the surveys.  
Together, these conclusions suggest that the discrepancies between national accounts and the 
surveys during 2001–2007 may have arisen from (1) the national accounts’ overestimation of 
nonagricultural growth, (2) the surveys’ underestimation of consumption growth and poverty reduction, 
or (3) both. Any of these explanations is plausible given the long time period since Tanzania last rebased 
its national accounts, as well as the extremely large price increases reported in the surveys (see World 
Bank 2009). However, regardless of which source is most accurate, Tanzania’s PGE is well below 
Uganda’s (i.e., 1.4 during 1993–2006), which has a similar per capita GDP and national poverty 
headcount rate (Thurlow, forthcoming).
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